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Charles J. Morris
Southern Methodist University
My purpose and concern in this chapter is to call attention to a criti-
cal missing link in the U.S. system of industrial relations. That link is 
members-only minority-union collective bargaining, which is a natural 
preliminary stage in the development of mature, majority-based exclu-
sivity bargaining. What follows is an abbreviated version of some of the 
key elements of that thesis, which is more fully developed in my recent 
book, The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the 
American Workplace.1 Minority-union bargaining was commonly prac-
ticed immediately before and after enactment of the Wagner Act2 (the 
National Labor Relations Act) in 1935, and as I demonstrate in that book, 
it was not Congress’ intent to deny protection to such bargaining under 
that act. During the early years following its passage, such bargaining 
prevailed widely. The decisive provisions of the act, which were not af-
fected by either the Taft-Hartley3 or Landrum-Griffin4 amendments, are 
still fully in effect today. Under those provisions, in workplaces where 
no exclusive bargaining agent has yet been “designated or selected . . . 
by the majority of the employees” in an appropriate bargaining unit 
pursuant to Section 9(a)5 of the act, minority employees are entitled “to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.”6 
But as the industrial relations community is well aware, latter-day con-
ventional wisdom assumes the contrary. This is so despite the absence 
of any decisional authority to support such a negative conclusion, for 
neither the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) nor the courts have 
ever held that an employer has no duty to bargain with a nonmajority 
union for its members only.7 Indeed, that conventional wisdom has be-
come so entrenched that it has not been questioned by most labor law 
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scholars, almost all of whom have assumed that the majoritarian/exclu-
sivity concept—which so uniquely characterizes U.S. labor law―im-
plies a prohibition on all minority-union bargaining even where no ma-
jority representative has been selected. Although many scholars have 
criticized that system, only two have unequivocally contended that in 
the absence of a designated majority representative, minority unions 
have legally enforceable collective bargaining rights. They are E.G. 
Latham8 and Clyde Summers,9 who expressed their views in law review 
articles separated by more than half a century.10
Immediately after passage of the act, Latham wrote that under what 
“appears to be a reasonable construction of [the pertinent] sections, 
the employer may be bound to bargain with minority groups until . . . 
‘proper majorities’ have been selected.”11 Summers, writing in 1990, 
continued where Latham had left off. After reviewing the statutory lan-
guage and the historical role of minority unions, Summers concluded 
that “[t]he plain words of section 7, section 8(1) and section 8(5) would 
seem to require an employer, in the absence of a majority union, to bar-
gain collectively with a non-majority union for its own members.”12 I 
have added my voice to that of Latham and Summers as to the intended 
meaning of the act regarding such bargaining. Statutory text provides 
that such minority bargaining is fully protected by the act, and legisla-
tive history supports that conclusion. 
My analysis begins by focusing on the 14-word phrase in Section 
7 that declares that “employees shall have the right to . . . bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing.” This simple 
but elegantly worded declaration is the substantive mandate that grants 
the right of collective bargaining to all employees covered by the act. 
Until a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit se-
lect an exclusive representative under Section 9(a), this right to bargain 
prevails, for there is no other provision in the act that diminishes that 
right. This 14-word phrase has a clear and long-established meaning, 
the evolution of which can be traced through a direct line of succession 
beginning with identical text contained in a proclamation by President 
Wilson in World War I,13 then to the preamble of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act of 1932,14 then to the corresponding phrase in Section 7(a) of the 
Depression-era National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933,15 and 
finally to the Wagner Act in 1935―the language in the statute today. 
Even the accompanying unfair-labor-practice text in Section 8(a)(1), 
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“to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of [that] 
right,” is the same as the corresponding prohibitory language in those 
earlier sources.16 This juxtaposition of text in its various legislative in-
carnations confirms that the substantive law here in issue—albeit not 
its enforcement procedure—has been continuously in effect in one or 
more manifestations since 1932. Thus, when Congress passed the Wag-
ner Act it was reenacting the substantive bargaining requirements that 
had prevailed under the “Blue Eagle” of the NIRA, where the critical 
statutory language in Sections 7 and 8(1)17 had already acquired a rec-
ognized meaning.18 
Historically, including the years immediately preceding passage of 
the Wagner Act, collective bargaining as an institution was intertwined 
with the concept of union membership,19 for unions normally bargained 
only on behalf of their members.20 Union recognition by an employer 
usually occurred only after the union’s membership was strong enough 
to demand and receive recognition—which more often than not resulted 
from a strike or threat of a strike. Union membership was the sine qua 
non of collective bargaining, whereas majority selection by the employ-
ees was not a requisite for bargaining and it played little or no role in 
the process.21 
Even closed-shop agreements fitted the connection of member-
ship to collective bargaining. When a union’s membership was large 
enough to represent an effective voice for most if not all of the involved 
employees, union leaders would usually perceive a need to ensure job 
security for their members and protection for the bargaining process, 
which only a closed-shop agreement could provide. On the other hand, 
when a union was not strong enough to obtain a closed shop or even full 
recognition, it often settled for a members-only collective agreement,22 
for this was considered a logical step in an organizational process that 
would eventually lead to total employee recognition. 
During the pre-Wagner Act years, strikes and boycotts or threats of 
such activity were usually a union’s only means of securing recognition, 
for employers vigorously opposed dealing with outside unions. Under 
the NIRA, the collective bargaining process mandated by Section 7(a) 
required only three factors: 1) a union representing a group of employ-
ees, 2) a demand for recognition and bargaining, and 3) an employer 
who was expected to respond by engaging in good-faith negotiations. 
It quickly became apparent under that statute, however, that almost all 
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employers vigorously resisted union recognition unless it was forced 
upon them by strikes or boycotts. for there was no adequate enforce-
ment mechanism to require compliance with the law.23 The Wagner Act 
was designed to correct those procedural deficiencies but not to change 
the substantive law.24
In conducting my research I was fortunate to discover a reliable 
description of the essential characteristics of employer–employee rela-
tions prevailing at that stage in the nation’s labor history. In November 
1933, the National Industrial Conference Board (Conference Board)25 
conducted an extensive empirical study to determine the nature of col-
lective bargaining as it was practiced immediately following enactment 
of Section 7(a) of the NIRA.26 That study covered the fields of manufac-
turing and mining. These proved to be the most appropriate industries 
to investigate for they included the companies mainly impacted by Sec-
tion 7(a) and were also the ones that would ultimately be most affected 
by the Wagner Act. 
The data27 show that a variety of bargaining arrangements existed 
during this period. 45.7 percent of employees dealt with their employ-
ers on an individual basis, 45 percent dealt through employee-repre-
sentation plans (i.e., company unions), and 9.3 percent dealt through 
independent labor unions. 68.9 percent of the reporting companies en-
gaged in no bargaining at all—i.e., neither with an independent union 
nor a company union. The remaining 31.1 percent engaged in bargain-
ing with either an independent union or a company union or with both, 
including arrangements whereby employees in many of the companies 
also engaged in individual bargaining. This group of 31.1 percent of the 
reporting companies consisted of 1,030 of the 3,314 responding compa-
nies in a representative sample of 10,335 companies. Two hundred and 
thirty of those companies bargained with independent unions represent-
ing 189,756 employees on an exclusive basis, and 186 bargained with 
independent unions representing 51,100 employees on a nonexclusive 
basis. 
Accordingly, of the latter total of 416 companies that bargained 
with independent unions, 55 percent did so on an exclusive basis and 
45 percent bargained on a members-only-basis. The 51,110 union em-
ployees who were not involved in exclusive representation—i.e., the 
union employees in the companies that engaged in members-only bar-
gaining—were thus working, in varying combinations and job catego-
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ries, alongside 124,101 other employees who were either wholly non-
union or were represented by company unions. Together, those workers 
comprised a total of 175,211 employees, which may be compared to 
the slightly higher number of 189,756 employees covered by exclu-
sive union representation. Extrapolating from the survey group to the 
nationwide employee populations of companies in manufacturing and 
mining, one arrives at totals of approximately 189,260 union employees 
covered by members-only collective bargaining, as compared with ap-
proximately 702,800 union employees covered by exclusive collective 
bargaining. In other words, of all union members employed in manu-
facturing and mining in 1933, approximately 21 percent were repre-
sented by independent minority unions that engaged in members-only 
bargaining. And, as noted above, the percentage of companies that bar-
gained with these minority unions was considerably higher, comprising 
45 percent of all the companies that engaged in some form of collective 
bargaining. These data dramatically portray the eclectic nature of trade-
union representation in the manufacturing and mining industries when 
Section 7(a) was enacted and thus confirm that members-only bargain-
ing through independent minority unions was a common phenomenon 
in those industries; there is no reason to believe that manufacturing and 
mining were unique in this regard. Although the findings by the Confer-
ence Board may seem surprising today, that same general information 
was common knowledge at the time.28 Thus, on the eve of congressio-
nal consideration of the Wagner bill, minority-union bargaining was a 
highly visible part of the industrial relations landscape.29
Indeed, under Section 7(a) of the NIRA, majority status was not a 
prerequisite for collective bargaining. The National Labor Board, an 
executive agency that President Roosevelt had created to implement 
Section 7(a), routinely found breaches of the duty to bargain with less-
than-majority unions. That agency only used elections to determine 
majority status when there was a dispute between two unions claiming 
representation—one of which was usually a company union―or when 
an employer questioned a union’s claim of majority representation, or 
when a substantial number of employees requested it; otherwise, major-
ity status was deemed irrelevant.30
The legislative history of Wagner’s first attempt, his 1934 Labor 
Disputes bill,31 as well as his ultimately successful 1935 National Labor 
Relations bill, demonstrates that the bargaining provisions in both bills 
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were intended to protect minority-union bargaining. The 1934 bill—S. 
2926—was silent regarding majority representation,32 clearly indicating 
that an employer had a duty to bargain with any union that represented 
its employees, whether a majority union or a minority union.33 And the 
history of the enactment of the 1935 bill—S. 1958—positively indi-
cates that minority-union bargaining preliminary to mature majority-
based exclusive bargaining would be fully protected by the statutory 
text. Although many aspects of that history support this conclusion,34 
one feature not previously recognized is especially revealing—in fact, 
it is the “smoking gun” that confirms such intent behind the passage of 
Section 8(5).35
The bill Senator Wagner introduced in the Senate on February 21, 
1935, S. 1958,36 was intentionally designed to be substitute legislation 
that would correct the enforcement shortcomings of Section 7(a). It 
achieved this by codifying, clarifying, and slightly strengthening the 
substantive rights contained in Section 7(a) and by incorporating and 
giving statutory status to the majority-rule concept that the old NLRB 
had previously adopted by decision and practice; specifically, the old 
NLRB Houde37 decision required bargaining exclusivity after selection 
of a majority representative but left standing the requirement to bargain 
with minority unions prior to such majority designation.38 To adminis-
ter and enforce those rights and corresponding duties, the bill created 
a new labor board that was “styled National Labor Relations Board to 
provide continuity with the existing agency.”39 Thus, the new bill was 
not intended to create new law but rather to reestablish old law, adding 
only clarity and teeth. Recognition of that purpose is of prime impor-
tance to the construction of the act for, as Professor William Eskridge 
points out, “when Congress borrows a statute, it adopts by implica-
tion interpretation placed on that statute, absent express statement to 
the contrary.”40
It should be noted that the original Wagner bill did not contain a 
separate Section 8(5) duty-to-bargain unfair labor practice. Wagner and 
Leon Keyserling, his legislative assistant and primary author of both 
bills,41 were of the opinion that such a specific provision was unneces-
sary because the employer’s duty to bargain was adequately covered 
by the broad collective-bargaining requirement contained in Section 
7—i.e., the vintage 14-word phrase previously noted—under which a 
refusal to bargain represented an interference with the workers’ right to 
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bargain collectively, hence was enforceable under Section 8(1). Wag-
ner’s testimony to that effect, which expressly cited the Houde decision, 
was unequivocal: 
The right of employees to bargain collectively implies a duty on 
the part of the employer to bargain with their representatives. [T]he 
incontestably sound principle is that the employer is obligated by 
the statute to negotiate in good faith with his employees’ repre-
sentatives; to match their proposals, if unacceptable with counter 
proposals; and to make every reasonable effort to reach an agree-
ment.42
Section 9(a), with its specification of exclusivity when and if em-
ployees choose a majority representative, which was—and still is—the 
only limitation on the bargaining requirement, provided that 
representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropri-
ate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all 
the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing . . .
The bargaining requirement, however, was contained only in Section 
7 and in the unfair-labor-practice enforcement mechanism in Section 
8(1). 
The inclusion of a separate duty-to-bargain unfair labor practice―
Section 8(5)―was an afterthought that was not intended to change the 
substantive bargaining requirements of the original bill. In fact, that 
provision was not added until two and a half months after S. 1958 had 
been introduced. Francis Biddle, chairman of the old NLRB under the 
NIRA, had lobbied long and hard for its inclusion. Although Wagner fi-
nally agreed to the inclusion, he and the Senate committee in its report, 
and later also the House committee in its report, made it expressly clear 
that all four separate unfair-labor-practice provisions following Section 
8(1)—including the new Section 8(5)—would “not . . . impose any limi-
tations or restrictions on the general guarantees of [Section 8(1)], for 
they were designed only to amplify and spell out specifically the most 
troubling unfair labor practices.”43 They were thus meant to reinforce 
those unfair labor practices, not to diminish them.
Regarding the meaning of the belated amendment, a previously un-
recognized aspect of the history of Section 8(5) shows unequivocally 
that it was not intended to exclude the requirement of a duty to bargain 
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with a minority union where there was not yet an exclusive Section 
9(a) majority union. I found this historical feature in a post-introduction 
draft of S. 1958 (third draft) that had been prepared between February 
21 and March 11, 1935. It contained various proposed amendments, 
including the one relevant to this inquiry. (This draft had been in the 
possession of Leon Keyserling and was published in 1989 by Professor 
Kenneth Casebeer.44) After S. 1958 had been introduced and referred to 
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor on February 21, 1935, 
Biddle presented two versions of Section 8(5)—contained in this third 
draft—for the committee’s consideration, i.e., alternative texts of this 
proposed new unfair-labor-practice provision. They show conclusively 
that the addition of Section 8(5), which was added to S. 1958 when it 
was reported by the Senate Education and Labor Committee on May 2, 
was never intended to confine an employer’s bargaining duty to major-
ity-unions only. Here, verbatim, are the two versions from this draft: 
(5) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his 
employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9(a).
or, (5) To refuse to bargain collectively with employees through 
their representatives, chosen as provided in Section 9(a).45
By adopting the first version, Biddle, Keyserling (hence also Wagner46), 
and the Senate committee were consciously choosing language that 
would assure that the duty to bargain with a majority union would not 
exclude the duty to bargain with a minority union prior to the establish-
ment of majority representation.47 Patently, had the drafters intended 
to exclude such nonmajority bargaining they would have selected the 
second version, for it would have unequivocally limited the bargaining 
obligation under Section 8(5) to majority unions “chosen as provided in 
Section 9(a).” Here was the smoking gun.
The subject of minority-union bargaining prior to the designation of 
majority representation was not even an issue in the congressional de-
bates. Although minority-union members-only bargaining was common 
knowledge and the history of the legislative drafts demonstrates that the 
draftsmen were well aware of the need to protect such bargaining, it 
was not viewed as a controversial issue. There was, however, consider-
able controversy about the ultimate configuration of mature bargaining. 
Proponents of the bill believed that majority-rule bargaining—the bill’s 
solution to the problem of dual unionism—would mean more effective 
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bargaining, hence that was unequivocally the goal sought by Wagner 
and his supporters.48 On the other side of that debate, the employer lob-
by advocated plurality bargaining, opposed majority rule as a denial of 
the rights of minorities, and asserted that the board’s authority to deter-
mine the bargaining unit would lead to a closed shop.49 In that context, 
employers clearly defended the right of minority unions to engage in 
collective bargaining. 
The debates focused on the anticipated presence of multiple unions 
and on whether a minority union should have bargaining rights after a 
majority union had been chosen. There was no discussion about minor-
ity-union bargaining prior to the establishment of majority representa-
tion, and numerous statements by the proponents of the bill showed full 
recognition that the majority rule provided by Section 9(a) would apply 
to bargaining only after employees had selected their majority represen-
tative.50 There was never a question voiced about the nonapplicability 
of that restriction prior to majority selection. And although elections 
were looked upon as one of the best means to settle disputes over union 
representation, the disputes that were generally anticipated concerned 
the choice of which union would represent the employees, not whether 
the employees would be represented. 
Legislative history therefore confirms what the nonambiguous lan-
guage of the statute requires. That text, standing alone, establishes that 
in workplaces where employees have not yet selected a majority repre-
sentative, an employer has an affirmative duty to engage in good-faith 
bargaining with a nonmajority union that seeks to negotiate only on 
behalf of its employee members.51 This is a fundamental right of con-
stitutional proportions. As the Supreme Court characterized Section 7 
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.52 (its first case construing 
the NLRA), “the right of employees to self-organization and to select 
representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining . . . is a 
fundamental right . . . ”53 As I demonstrate in The Blue Eagle at Work, 
such right of association is protected by the First Amendment to the 
U.S Constitution.54 Indeed, the Supreme Court declared in the Gissel55 
case in a comparative reference to an employer’s freedom of expression 
under Section 8(c),56 which the Court said “merely implements the First 
Amendment,”57 “an employer’s rights cannot outweigh the equal rights 
of the employees to associate freely, as those rights are embodied in §7 
and protected by §8(a)(1) . . . ”58 Furthermore, the right of employees 
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in a less-than-majority union to engage in collective bargaining is also 
a fundamental human right that is recognized by international law to 
which the United States is a party.59
What then is the state of the currently recognized law on this issue? 
Although there have been no decisions explicitly holding that an em-
ployer has a duty to bargain with a minority union on a members-only 
basis where there is not presently a Section 9(a) representative, sev-
eral cases from both the Supreme Court and the Labor Board actually 
point in that direction. Indeed, these cases confirm the legality of such 
bargaining and resulting contracts under Sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(2), and 
8(a)(3).60 Furthermore, there are no NLRB or court decisions holding 
that such minority-union bargaining is not required by the act.61 Al-
though latter-day conventional wisdom assumes that the only bargain-
ing duty countenanced by the act is bargaining with a majority union 
in an appropriate unit, such conventional wisdom, like the emperor, has 
no clothes.
Immediately after passage of the act in 1935, however, conventional 
wisdom indicated otherwise. For several years following its enactment, 
no legal questions were raised as to the scope of the act’s bargaining 
requirements, either as to members-only minority-union bargaining or 
majority-exclusivity bargaining.62 As previously noted, both types of 
bargaining had prevailed under the old NIRA and now both prevailed 
under the new NLRA. By 1938, a year after the Wagner Act was de-
clared constitutional,63 members-only contracts were perhaps as com-
mon—if not more common—than majority-exclusivity contracts,64 and 
their coverage may have been even more extensive. Both unions and 
employers in large numbers found members-only agreements prag-
matically useful. At places where unions had organized a substantial 
number—but less than a majority—of a company’s bargaining-unit em-
ployees and majority support did not seem likely or easily attainable, 
membership-based contracts were welcomed and many were signed. 
Such contracts were viewed as a preliminary stage in the organizational 
and collective bargaining process. When the unions achieved majority 
status these contracts were almost always replaced by conventional ex-
clusive-recognition agreements. Although employers generally resisted 
unionization of their employees, there seems to be no indication of any 
employer contending that it had no legal duty to bargain with a minor-
ity union for its members only. Numerous companies engaged in such 
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bargaining and signed members-only agreements—often readily—for 
they considered this limited form of recognition a lesser evil than ex-
clusive recognition inasmuch as the latter was usually accompanied by 
a demand for a closed shop. 
On March 2, 1937, U.S. Steel recognized the CIO’s Steel Workers 
Organizing Committee (SWOC) as bargaining agent for employees who 
were its members,65 and that agreement became the model for the steel 
industry.66 By December 15, 1937, of the 445 contracts entered into by 
the SWOC, 85 percent provided for members-only recognition,67 and 
“[o]n the basis of number of employees embraced, the model agreement 
had a coverage of 98 percent of all those working under contracts with 
the union.”68 Eventually these members-only agreements were replaced 
by exclusive agreements.69 What happened in steel was also happening 
in many other workplaces in U.S. industry.70  
General Motors (GM) was a part of this pattern, though reluctantly. 
Following a series of sit-down strikes, pressure from the White House, 
and dogged mediation by Michigan’s governor Frank Murphy, GM on 
February 11, 1937, agreed to recognize the United Automobile Work-
ers (UAW) as the representative of its members only.71 On March 24, 
Chrysler followed suit with similar recognition. The members-only 
agreement thus emerged as a critical part of the UAW organizing pro-
gram. By 1938, of the 537 auto industry contracts signed by the UAW, 
343—i.e., 64 percent—were members-only agreements.72 These agree-
ments were considered useful stepping stones on the path to majority 
membership and mature collective bargaining.73 By 1942 nearly all the 
plants where the UAW had first achieved recognition on a members-
only basis were now locked in for “sole bargaining rights.”74
Not surprisingly, however, by the early 1940s, members-only 
agreements had become increasingly rare and were soon forgotten, 
for unions were now taking the path of least resistance and bypassing 
that early bargaining stage, seeking instead—and in most cases achiev-
ing—majority-bargaining rights directly through NLRB representation 
procedures. During the board’s first decade, unions were successful in 
winning recognition in over 85 percent of their representation cases.75 
NLRB elections thus became habit-forming in a relatively short period 
of time. 
Although unions originally favored board elections out of sheer 
convenience, reliance on the election process, especially during and af-
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ter World War II, now became routine, with concomitant unawareness 
of the true scope of bargaining offered by the statute. As for employers, 
they had no reason to question dependence on the election process, for 
they were learning that elections provided an ideal forum in which to 
mount offensive campaigns against union representation. NLRB elec-
tions therefore became the centerpiece of the statute and eventually the 
established norm. In due time, the interplay of the employers’ self-in-
terest and the unions’ acquiescence in relying on elections effectively 
repressed all institutional memory of minority-union bargaining. 
Today, with the prospect of restoring that memory, it is time for 
the labor movement to return to its roots, to return to organizing on the 
basis of members-only collective bargaining, for this may be labor’s 
best opportunity to reverse the precipitous decline of union membership 
in the private sector. Such organizational efforts will of course have to 
be accompanied by appropriate legal action designed to reaffirm and 
articulate the original and correct interpretation of the law.76
How will this less-than-majority organizational process differ from 
conventional organizing usually designed to culminate in an election? 
The differences, which are substantial, concern both form and sub-
stance. From the very beginning, the emphasis in a union’s organiza-
tional campaign will be on building a union, not on winning an election. 
This process will call for a totally different mind-set. For example, a 
membership-based campaign will not seek or solicit union-authoriza-
tion cards—rather, it will seek and offer genuine union membership, 
just as unions did before they became addicted to the election process. 
Employees who join and pay dues77 to a developing union will know 
they are making a meaningful commitment to the organization. To ac-
commodate the resulting new categories of membership, unions that 
engage in member-based organizing will probably adjust their dues 
structures accordingly, perhaps by instituting a multitiered plan. Pay-
ment of union dues, even though nominal in amount, will mean that 
pro-union employees will have “put their money where their mouth is,” 
and having paid their dues there will be no doubt as to their voluntary 
choice of union representation.78 
The position of union steward in the new organization will be espe-
cially important, for that person will have an early role to play in deal-
ing with the employer. Acting pursuant to the long-standing rule in the 
Weingarten79 case, i.e., in a recognized union setting, the union steward 
Members-Only Collective Bargaining   263
will be the person called upon to aid an employee in need of assistance at 
a potentially disciplinary interview, for since the board’s 2004 decision 
in IBM Corporation,80 an unrepresented employee in a nonunion work-
place is no longer entitled to the assistance of an ordinary coworker at 
a Weingarten interview. Accordingly, the newly organized union should 
make known to every employee in the workplace that its union steward 
is available to aid union members, both old and new, who are called 
in for investigatory interviews that might result in disciplinary action. 
The law requires that if the employer proceeds with such an interview, 
the steward must be permitted to attend and participate if the member 
requests the steward’s presence. The steward of this new union—who 
ideally will be an experienced and well-respected employee—will thus 
be the logical person to provide a targeted employee with support and 
representation in the interview. And because the Weingarten rule does 
not require the employer to give employees any notice of their right to 
representation, not even to the employee slated for the interview, for 
the “right arises only in situations where the employee requests rep-
resentation,”81 it will behoove the organizing union to make known to 
all employees that this guaranteed right is available to all represented 
employees. As a practical matter, the right can also be made available to 
any nonunion employee who takes advantage of expedited union mem-
bership that is likely to be offered by the union steward. 
This brings me to the collective-bargaining role that distinguishes 
how a developing union will henceforth operate at its organizational 
stage, as compared with the manner in which most unions presently 
conduct their organizing campaigns. Once the new union has achieved 
sufficient size and structure—and only good judgment and experience, 
and perhaps good luck in the absence of experience, will indicate when 
that has occurred—the new union will notify the employer (preferably 
in writing) of its existence, of its representational status for its mem-
bers, and of any immediate requests for negotiations on their behalf. 
This initial notification might also introduce a request to bargain about 
a limited number of general subjects that it deems urgent or worthy 
of prompt attention—for example, employee discipline and grievance 
procedures, bulletin board space, or any other pressing issue requiring 
early resolution. 
After the company has thus been notified of the union’s represen-
tational status and members-only recognition has been requested, the 
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union’s chief function will be simply to act like a union, which means 
concentrating on representing its members regarding a multiplicity of 
work-related issues. This should prove to be of assistance not only to 
existing members, but also should serve to attract new members. As 
Freeman and Rogers have pointed out, workers who experience union 
membership, especially current membership, overwhelmingly tend to 
favor union representation.82 Employees who have participated person-
ally in the developing union will be its strongest advocates, and their 
enthusiasm is likely to be contagious. The organizational process is thus 
merged with the representational process.
The raw material for the new union’s initial forays into collective 
bargaining will be the numerous changes in employment conditions 
that frequently arise in any workplace, i.e., the routine employment 
decisions that nonunion employers typically make unilaterally, though 
sometimes with nominal input from affected employees. Where em-
ployees are represented by a bargaining agent—which will now be the 
case for minority-union members—any such unilateral change in em-
ployees’ working conditions or status will almost always represent a 
per se refusal to bargain.83 Such separate potential bargaining situations 
may now be actively addressed by the new union.
As these ad hoc incidents arise concerning changes in bargainable 
subjects that might affect one or more union members, it will be the 
union’s responsibility to provide assistance and voice to the person or 
persons affected, for, as the Supreme Court stressed in Conley v. Gib-
son,84 “[c]ollective bargaining is a continuing process”85 that involves 
day-to-day adjustments in working conditions―it is not a condition that 
occurs only when a bargaining contract is being negotiated.86 Inasmuch 
as good-faith bargaining requires negotiating to impasse as a precon-
dition to unilateral implementation,87 if time is a factor the employer 
will have some legal incentive to reach a mutually satisfactory resolu-
tion of the issue. Usually, however, if a union has little or no means to 
pressure an employer—which will probably be the case for almost all 
less-than-majority unions at the organizational stage—success at ad hoc 
bargaining, if there is any, will depend largely on the reasonableness of 
the union’s proposals and the persuasiveness of its spokesperson. That 
person will probably be an outside union representative whose physical 
presence inside the workplace will in itself convey a powerful message 
to wavering nonunion employees. This mini-bargaining process may 
Members-Only Collective Bargaining   265
thus bring its own reward even if the meetings prove to be no more than 
meet-and-confer sessions. In many cases, however, especially during 
the early stages of this unfamiliar procedure, the process will undoubt-
edly require the support—whether explicitly or implicitly—of NLRB 
enforcement; lawful economic pressure may also be required. 
Bargaining while organizing will certainly not be trouble-free. Nev-
ertheless, this direct participation by employees and their union should 
provide a more potent response to an employer’s effort to spread its an-
tiunion message through captive audiences and one-on-one contact. But 
without an election goal, and with its obligation to bargain continuing 
regardless of the union’s lack of majority, the employer may eventually 
find its antiunion presentations less effective and perhaps even counter-
productive. 
In workplaces where members-only organizing and bargaining is 
finally accepted—which will undoubtedly require considerable time, 
a good deal of patience, and pursuasive legal education― ad hoc bar-
gaining episodes will probably continue until the parties jointly decide 
to initiate serious negotiations for a comprehensive agreement or the 
union on its own feels that it has sufficient members (albeit less than a 
majority) to exercise enough bargaining clout to request full contract 
negotiations. When a collective bargaining contract is finally agreed 
upon, it will apply to union members only; but it will be a legally en-
forceable agreement.88 In all probability, the company will make the 
same economic benefits available to comparably situated nonunion em-
ployees, which will be its right and undoubtedly its preference. The 
contractual grievance procedure, however, will be applicable to union 
members only.89
When a minority union finally achieves majority membership, it 
will of course need to demonstrate that fact in order to become the em-
ployees’ exclusive bargaining representative. It may be anticipated, 
however, that many unions will have no need to resort to elections or 
other external means to prove majority status, for their visible growth 
with members-only bargaining will have achieved a fait accompli that 
convinces the employer that an election or other verification would 
serve no useful purpose. In other workplaces, however, an election may 
be needed to confirm the new union’s majority, although such a union 
may well be advised not to proceed to an election until it is actively 
functioning as a viable labor organization. This was the election pat-
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tern that commonly occurred during the early years following passage 
of the Wagner Act, especially in the steel and automobile industries.90 
That pattern may now be repeated, but not universally. Considering 
the endemic nature of most U.S. employers’ deep-seated opposition to 
unions and the aversion of some workers toward unions, it is likely that 
some minority unions will not develop into majority unions—at least 
not promptly, and in many cases never. Even so, the workers in those 
unions will be exercising their right “to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing” notwithstanding that a majority 
of their coworkers have not chosen to join with them. These minority-
union employees will at least have some degree of union protection and 
benefits―though with limited bargaining power. Yet their status need 
not necessarily be viewed as temporary or incomplete. Union members 
and nonmembers ought to be able to work side-by-side with each other 
without special problems, provided the employer does not interfere with 
the exercise of freedom of choice to belong or not to belong to a labor 
union, and provided the union in turn recognizes that its existence does 
not require absolute majority status. Minority unionism is not uncom-
mon in many other countries, especially in Europe. 
This brings to a conclusion my brief restatement of the law regard-
ing minority-union bargaining and my thumbnail descriptive forecast of 
the organizational and bargaining procedures that minority unions may 
now follow. I am not suggesting, however, that once the law recognizes 
the right of minority unions to bargain for their members only prior 
to establishment of Section 9(a) representation that union organizing 
will be easy. Nor am I predicting that employers will cease fighting 
unions and thereafter abandon their efforts to maintain a union-free en-
vironment. But when employers realize that henceforth workers will 
require neither a majority union nor an election to be entitled to engage 
in collective bargaining, a major incentive for mounting aggressive an-
tiunion campaigns will have vanished. Furthermore, employers will no 
longer have election targets with finite campaign timelines in which 
to persuade, promise, intimidate, or punish employees to discourage 
them from voting for union representation. Nevertheless, many em-
ployers will probably persist in discharging and otherwise discriminat-
ing against union employees, and undoubtedly many will continue to 
issue threats and promises-of-benefits to discourage unionization. But 
at some point in time, compliance with the NLRA may actually be-
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come the established norm. That was Senator Wagner’s intended goal. 
Despite the debilitating administrative and judicial constructions that 
have been inflicted on the act over the years, its core provisions remain 
intact. With the prospect of a resumption of members-only organizing 
and bargaining, democratic rights may finally be reclaimed in the U.S. 
workplace.
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